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Abstract
This study aims to present empirical analysis from Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to address the
impact of ownership structure and dividends on the performance of Jordanian Manufacturing
Companies. To test the study hypotheses and to achieve its objectives, the annual financial
reports of all manufacturing companies and other related data during the period 2011 to 2015
were analyzed. Thus, Ownership structure and dividends are presented as independent variables,
while the firm's performance is articulated as the dependent variable. It applies four diverse
acceptable measurement tools as a proxy for the firm's performance (dependent variable);
(Tobin's Q), (ROA), (ROE), and (NPM). The study found that the main variables (MO, CO, and
DYLD) and the control variables (EPS and Total Assets) are good predictors of firm's
performance. Also; the study found that (ROA) and (Tobin's Q) are the most representative
indicators as proxies of the firm's performance. The study recommends considering another
control variable to enhance predicting the firm's performance such as governance mechanisms,
board structure, management competence, motivation-based payment structure, capital structure
and external and internal auditing.
JEL Classification: G32, G35, M41, L60.
Keywords: Concentrated and management ownership, dividends, firm’s performance, Tobin’s
Q, ROA, ROE, NPM.
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Introduction
For many years, the relationship between ownership structure, dividends structure, and firm
performance are considered key areas of study in the field of Corporate Governance, to ensure
the best performance and diminish agency costs, ownership structure is one of the main
governance tools along with other factors such as board, leverage, motivation-based payment,
dividends, and assurance services. Many studies revealed the relationship between ownership
structure and firm performance such as Morck et al., (2000). While previous studies have found
that there is a need to provide more evidence on the linkage between a firm’s performance and
dividends. The payout decision is materially considered by both shareholders and executives
(Baker & Powell, 1999; Ajanthan, 2013; Azeez & Latifat, 2015). Dividends payout is usually
emerged from the firm’s earnings, performance and cash flow (Ahmed & Javid, 2009).
Dividends policy is important because it determines the payout, retained earnings ratio, and
performance. Firm performance, in this instance, can be presented as to how better a firm
maximizes its investor’s wealth and the generating earnings from the investments by investors.
(Baker & Powell, 2001).
Some previous studies have different proposals about the positive relationship between payouts
and future share prices, such as (Dhanani, 2005), while others; such as (Farsio et al., 2004) argue
that dividends do not have an illustrative impact to forecast future performance. Few studies
have addressed the impact of ownership structure and dividends payout policies collectively on
firm's performance in the Middle East countries. Our study may be considered one of the
entrepreneur studies which address Jordan as a developing country.
This study aims to provide empirical evidence from Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to address
the impact of ownership structure and dividends on firm’s performance of Jordanian
Manufacturing firms listed on (ASE). A sample of listed firms over the recent six-year period
(2010-2015) was selected. Data was processed from the financial statements of the sample.
Many works of literature have measured the firm's performance in different manners; Khamees,
et al. (2014) only implemented (ROA) and (Tobin's Q), While (Murekefu and Ouma (2012) run
(NPAT) Margin, Amidu (2007) used (ROA), (ROE), and (Tobin’s Q) as a robustness check.
Shu-Ching & Wenching (2006), measured the performance by running (ROA), (EPS), (NPM)
and (ROE). Nadia (2004) used the accounting measurement (ROA). Holderness et al., (1999).
Himmelberg et al. (1999), Cho (1998), Loderer and Martin (1997), Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991), McConnell and Servaes (1990), all used (Tobin’s Q) as a proxy for performance
measurement.
In order to diagnose and address the differences in results when running each measurement of
the above measures; our study is going to use (Tobin’s Q) in addition to other relevant
accounting measures (ROA, ROE, and NPM) as interpreters of firm’s performance.
The outcomes of this study are anticipated to be valuable to many involved parties, such as;
investors, finance directors, and academic sides. When making an investment decision and
portfolio management, developing a dividends policy, and adds more to the existing accounting
and financial literacy. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section two provides
problem definition, Section three provides literature reviews and hypotheses development,
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section four presents methodology used in data collection and analysis; the fifth one discusses
the findings, while section six presents a brief conclusion.
Problem Definition
Ownership structure, dividends policies, and firm's performance are essential fields of research in
the area of corporate governance and agency theory.
A Jordanian study by Jaafar and El-Shawwa (2009) found a relationship between performance
and ownership concentration, board size, and multiple directorships performance respectively.
Another study was conducted in Bahrain by Khamees et al., (2015) used (ROA) and (Tobin's Q)
revealed that dividends and institutional ownership positively affect performance. Also; Morck et
al. (2000) supported that the firm’s value rises when management ownership increases. Other
studies found that ownership structure is insignificant in interpreting firm’s performance
(Domsetz and Villalonga 2001). There are not any clear pieces of evidence provided by the
association between Ownership structure, dividends payout and firm’s performance in Jordan;
while there are many previous kinds of literature from developed economies have focused on the
association between those factors; therefore, this study is looking for filling this gap in the
literature by empirically examining the impact of Ownership structure and Dividend Payout on
the Firm's performance in Jordan.
Thus; this study will use the following four performance measures; (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and
NPM) as interpreters of the performance of manufacturing companies listed on ASE.
The study may provide answers to the following two main questions:
1. Is there any impact of ownership structure on firm’s performance?
2. Is there any impact of dividends on firm’s performance?
3. Which performance measure is the most representative as a proxy for the firm’s performance?
Also; the study aims to provide empirical evidence on the following question:
4. Is there any impact of control variables on the firm’s performance?
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Ownership structure and Firm’s Performance
The relationship between a firm's performance and ownership structure and measured by
ownership concentration and management ownership has been studied by many types of
research. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a significant positive relationship among Tobin’s
Q as a measure of a firm’s performance and institutional investors.
Morck et al. (1988), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Chen et al. (2005), Vein, Krivogorsky
(2006), Cornett et al. (2008) found a significant relationship between ownership structure and
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firm performance. Jaafar & El-Shawwa (2009) found that ownership concentration has a positive
relationship with performance; While other studies found the opposite (Cho, 1998), (Reyana and
Valdes, 2012), and (Wahla et al., 2012) revealed a negative relation. Other studies also found
that increased management, concentrated ownership, and payouts regularly increase firm value
(Morck et al., 2000; Sarac, 2002; Arnott & Asness, 2003; Berger, 2003;Sulong & Nor, 2008). A
study conducted in Bahrain by Khamees et al., (2015) used (ROA) and (Tobin's Q); revealed that
Institutional ownership had a positive effect on performance when using T'Q while it had a
negative insignificance effect when using ROA.
Based on the presented literature review, we could develop the following hypothesis in order to
report on the Impact of Ownership Structure on Firm’s Performance, by applying the four
suggested measures of Firm’s Performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM).
H01: There is no any impact of ownership structure on the performance of Jordanian
manufacturing companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.
Dividends Payout and Firm Performance
Many studies tried to address issues concerning the dividend payout policy and their proposed
impact on a firm’s performance. Studies conducted by Miller and Rock (1985) argued that
dividend policy plays a major role in predicting the firm's value which enhances shareholders
wealth. Other studies provided that dividend payout has a significant impact on a firm’s
performance (Zeckhauser & Pound 1990; Baker et al., 2001; Sulong & Nor, 2008; Uwalomwa et
al., 2012; Murekefu & Ouma, 2013; Ajanthan ,2013), another study conducted in Bahrain by
Khamees, et al, (2015) used two different measurements of performance (ROA) and (Tobin's Q)
revealed that dividends have a constructive impact on performance when using both
measurements of performance. However; Gill and Tibrewala (2010) found a negative
relationship. Kapoor et al. (2010) and Fersio, et al. (2004) found an insignificant association
between dividends and performance.
Based on the presented literature, we could develop the following hypothesis in order to report
on the Impact of Dividends on Firm’s Performance, by applying the four suggested measures of
Firm’s Performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM).
H02: There is no any impact of Dividends on the performance of Jordanian manufacturing
companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.
Data gathering and research methodology
This study selects all 67 manufacturing companies listed on ASE. In order to test the study
hypotheses and to achieve its objectives, the annual financial reports and other related data of the
study sample during the period 2011 to 2015 were analyzed. To diagnose and address the
differences in results when using each one of the agreed measures and to assess the relevance of
each one to justify variant results found by previous studies; our study used Tobin's Q along with
other relevant accounting measures (ROA, ROE, and NPM) as interpreters of firm’s
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performance. We run the regression analysis, ANOVA and Coefficient Analysis to provide new
empirical evidence on whether and in what way choice of measure of ownership structure (MO
and CO) and Dividends (DYLD) might impact the firm’s performance. Also; four control
variables were added to the model (DEBT RATIO, ASSETS TURNOVER, TOTAL ASSETS
and EPS). The three main independent variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) were added, one by one,
to the four different sets of control variables, and their behavior is then compared to the
regression coefficient analysis.
The Study variables
The study aims to figure out the impact of ownership structure and dividends on firm’s
performance Thus, Ownership structure and dividends are reflected as independent variables,
while the firm’s performance is the dependent variable. The study applies four different
acceptable measurement tools (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM) as interpreters of a firm’s
performance.
Dependent Variables
Firm’s Performance
Firm’s performance is the dependent variable which has been measured in other empirical
studies by using various accounting measures. (Sher & Yang, 2005), and (Shu-Ching &
Wenching, 2006) all used (ROA, ROE, EPS, ROS, and NPM), while; Tobin’s Q was used by
(Morck et al., 1988, 2000), (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) and (Khamis et al., 2015) as an
interpreter of firm’s performance. Firm’s performance is expressed by the following four
interpreters (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM).
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q for individual companies is thought of like the (market value of equity and liabilities) /
(book value of equity and liabilities). Obtaining the book value of equity and liabilities is
generally easier than getting the market valuation due to changes in daily market valuations.
Sulong and Nor (2008) reproduced the calculation of the modified version of Tobin's q ratio as a
measure of a firm's performance. This measure is broadly used in many kinds of literature; such
as (Mehran, 2008; Rathinasamy et al., 2000; Wolfe & Sauaia, 2003).
The simplified form of Tobin's Q ratio is depicted as follows:
Simple Q = (Market Value of Equity +Total DEBT) / Book value of TOTAL ASSETS
When Tobin’s Q ratio is greater than one shows that the market values the firm as being worthy
(Faizah, 2006).
Return on Equity (ROE)
ROE is an accounting based measure of performance in corporate governance research. (ROE) is
an important interpreter of the performance. Further; Zeitun and Tian (2007) found that ROA
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and ROE are the most significant measures used by analysts. It measures the profitability of
funds invested by stockholders; this measure is formed as follows:
ROE = Annual Net Income /Stockholders’ equity.
Return on Assets
ROA is used to measure a firm´s income in relation to all other assets. It measures the
effectiveness of economic resources allocated to the business. Wu and Cui (2002) afford that
there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm’s performance
calculated by ROA.
The ROA is calculated by dividing the net income by total assets deployed in the business over
the reporting period. It is presented as:
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets.
Net profit After-Tax Margin - NPM
NPM is a financial performance ratio, calculated by dividing net income after taxes by net sales.
A firm's NPM is an essential measure because it indicates the amount of earned profit per dollar
of sales. This ratio is presented as follows:
NPM = NPAT/ NET SALES
Based on our review of performance measures, and In order to answer the third question of the
study; this study developed the following hypothesis:
H03: There aren't any performance measures defined as a proxy for a firm’s performance.
Independent Variables
Ownership Structure
The study used two main independent variables which are Management Ownership (MO) and
Concentrated Ownership (CO). In this study; we defined Concentrated Ownership as percentage
shares held by the top five shareholders. A motive for using a five percent threshold is likely to
be the Jordanian disclosure requirements by the Jordan Securities Commission. Specifically, the
five largest shareholders are considered to be major shareholders irrespective of their share sizes.
Concentration measures are usually more effective in terms of both predicting powers of the
model and the significance level of their regression coefficient. Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
disputed that concentrated ownership would cut the agency cost, and later rising the firm’s
performance. Also; Wu and Cui (2002) provided that there is a positive relationship between
concentrated ownership and firm’s performance measured in term of ROA. While; Manawaduge
et al. (2009) revealed that ownership concentration did not show any effect on performance.
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The study used the top five Concentrated Ownership (CR5) model as follows (Sulong and Nor
2008):
5
CR 5 = Top1 / ∑ γi
i=1
Whereas Management Ownership is known as percentage shares held by managers, CEOs, etc. A
lot of literature provided the shares owned by managers form the management ownership (Morck
et al. 1988; Chen et al. 2003).
Dividends
Dividends were principally measured by dividends yield (dividends paid per share -to- market
share price ratio). That is, DYLD = DPS / MPS. The dividend yield was considered instead of the
payout ratio for two reasons. Firstly, the denominator in dividends yield is share price compared
to an accounting measure (net income). Secondly, to evade difficulties of negative payout ratios
are caused by negative income or excessively high payout ratios resulting from income being
close to zero (Schooley and Barney, 1994).
Control variables
Debt Ratio and Assets Turnover
Debt Ratio and Assets Turnover are taken as control variables. Debt Ratio (Debt) is functioned
out as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Jensen (1986) strains the significance of debt in
restrictive managerial choice over the use of free cash flow; Stulz (1988) and Bhabra (2007)
propose an opposite relationship between leverage and firm’s performance. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) disputed that debt is an adjusting tool that eases agency problems between management
and other shareholders; therefore, leverage impacts firm’s performance through monitoring
activities by debt holders, thus our study presented it as total debt divided by total assets to form
the Debt Ratio (Debt).
Assets turnover (AT) is calculated by dividing total sales by total assets. This control variable
was used by (Sulong and Nor, 2008) (Hamid Ulla et al., 2012) and (Khamees et al. 2015).
Firm Size
Our study considered firm size because it is likely that big firms seem attractive to stockholders.
Large firms may pay high dividends as discussed in Redding (1997). Short and Keasey (1999)
found that firm size has an effect on a firm's performance, while; Bhabra (2007) reveals that firm'
performance is negatively associated with firm size. Many previous studies have used total assets
to represent firm size (Khamees et al., 2015) and (Hamid Ullad et al. 2012). Our study used total
assets (FSIZE) as the indicator of firm size.
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Earnings per Share (EPS)
Earnings per share (EPS) ratio is calculated by dividing the income less preferred dividends by
the weighted average number of outstanding common shares. This measurement is used by
(Sulong and Nor, 2008), (Kumar and Sopariwala, 1992), and (Ahmed and Khababa, 1999).
Khamees et al. (2015) provided that EPS has an observed noticed impact on performance, while
Sulong and Nor (2008) provided a negative insignificant effect of EPS on Firm’s performance
using T’Q. Our study used EPS to address the conflicting results of previous studies.
The EPS = net income less preferred dividends / weighted average number of outstanding
common shares.
Based on our review of control variables and the way they were deployed, this study developed
the following hypothesis to answer the fourth question of the study.
H04: There is no any impact of control variables on the performance of Jordanian
manufacturing companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.
The study regression model:
Based on the above-explained variables of the study; we are able to develop the following
empirical model:
FPit (Tobin’s Q) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7
Prof + εit Eq
FPit (ROA) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7 Prof
+ εit Eq
FPit (ROE) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7 Prof
+ εit Eq
FPit (NPM) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7 Prof
+ εit Eq
Where:
FP
MO
CO
DYLD
Debt
AT
FSIZE
Prof

= Firm Performance represented by Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM.
= Managerial Ownership
= Concentrated Ownership
= DPS / MPS (Dividends per share divided to Market Price per Share
= Debt Ratio = Total Debts / Total Assets.
= Assets Turnover
= Total assets in thousands
= represented by EPS.
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α
Β
ε
(i,t)

= the constant term
= coefficient
= Error term and Subscript
= the value of the panel data variable “i” in year “t”.

Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis consists of regression, ANOVA, and the coefficient for each variable. The
package ‘Statistical Package for Social Sciences’ (SPSS) 18.0 Version was deployed in order to
analyze the data.
Multicollinearity test
This study tested multicollinearity between independent variables; it was found that Inflation
factor (VIF) value is less than 5 and above 0.1 so that there are no indicators of multicollinearity
between independent variables. The test for multicollinearity was conducted before analyzing the
regression model. As mentioned by Field (2000), this test is important because multicollinearity
can influence the parameters of a regression model.
Empirical Analysis and Discussion
Table 1: Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable
Tobins’ Q
ROA
ROE
NPM
Tobins’ Q
ROA
ROE
NPM
Tobins’ Q
ROA
ROE
NPM

Independent Variable
MO
MO
MO
MO
CO
CO
CO
CO
DYLD
DYLD
DYLD
DYLD

Model
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

R
.448a
.729a
.175a
.449a
.507a
.770a
.183a
.470a
.442a
.733a
.178a
.443a

R Square
.200
.531
.031
.202
.257
.592
.034
.221
.196
.537
.032
.196

Adjusted R Square
.191
.526
.019
.191
.248
.587
.021
.210
.186
.531
.020
.185

St. Error
.64707260592
7.1965219547
16.844465414
.41232555470
.62265940783
5.8113902894
17.269027239
.35389045225
.64826008931
7.1676083852
16.877145693
.41499735022

Table 2: ANOVA Analysis
Dependent Variable
Tobins’ Q
ROA
ROE
NPM
Tobins’ Q
ROA
ROE
NPM
Tobins’ Q
ROA
ROE
NPM

Independent variable
MO
MO
MO
MO
CO
CO
CO
CO
DYLD
DYLD
DYLD
DYLD

Mean Square
8.544
4781.010
730.056
3.200
10.372
3785.342
801.246
2.552
8.275
4828.700
754.025
3.104

115

F
20.405
92.315
2.573
18.824
26.751
112.084
2.687
20.375
19.690
93.990
2.647
18.021

Sig.
.000b
.000b
.026b
.000b
.000b
.000b
.021b
.000b
.000b
.000b
.023b
.000b
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According to above tables (1 and 2); this study found high consistency between regression and
ANOVA analysis, it is found that MO, CO, and DYLD have the highest correlation with the
firm’s performance which measured by ROA when comparing with other among other
independent variables. What the results mean is that 53.1%, 59.2 % and 53.7% respectively; of
the variance (R-Square) in the extent of dependent variable has been significantly explained by
the independent variables (MO, CO, and DYLD). Furthermore; F- Test showed that MO, CO,
and DYLD have the highest significant impact on firm's performance measured in terms of ROA
(92.315 %, 112.084 %, and 93.990%) respectively.
This result could be explained of that when the ownership of outstanding shares is concentrated
by management, and top shareholders will motivate and drive them to concentrate on utilizing
assets as a measure of good financial performance which will positively increase their
compensation, dividends, and returns as they are jointly accountable to the board and other minor
investors for utilizing assets. In addition to that; concentrated ownership by management and top
shareholders will lead them to feel that the firm is their own investment by which they will work
together to increase (ROA) as a financial measure of firm’s performance by directing and
affecting the operational and financial policies and decisions to ensure the highest level of return
on invested assets in the firm.
On the other hand; DYLD plays a significant positive role on the firm's performance measured
by the return on assets of that DYLD encourages both management and top shareholder to utilize
the usage of invested assets to ensure they will get more payout ratio out of achieved return, in
other words; DYLD motivates management and top shareholders to manage and operate the
invested assets in a productive manner to get more cash proceeds for their investments in the
firm. Also; Shareholder’s wealth is maximized through effective investment strategies, financed
by an optimal capital structure. Furthermore; this study found that MO, CO, and DYLD have a
significant positive correlation with firm's performance which measured by Tobin's Q and NPM.
While the MO, CO and DYLD also have an insignificant positive correlation with ROE as a
proxy of firm's performance (R Square MO =3.1 %, CO = 3.4 % and DYLD = 3.2%) and (F-Test
MO = 2.573 %, CO = 2.687 % and DYLD = 2.647 %) respectively. So, the correlation of MO,
CO, and DYLD with firm's performance measures (ROA, Tobin's Q and NPM) is still significant
positive, but explicitly more than the significant correlation with ROE.
A company's after-tax profit margin (NPM) is important because it tells investors the percentage
of money a company actually earns per dollar of sales. These results are in line with Xu and
Wang (1999), Ajanthan, (2013) and Sulong and Nor (2008).
Also; Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Chen et al. (2005), Vein Krivogorsky (2006), Cornett et al.
(2008) and Jaafar & El-Shawwa (2009) found a positive relation between ownership
concentration and firm’s performance. On the contrast; the study results disagree with the study
of Severin (2001). Also; the result of this study is lined with Khamees et al., (2015).
The results of this study are lined with Uwalomwa et al., (2012), Murekefu and Ouma, (2013),
Ajanthan, (2013), and Priya and Nimalathasan, (2013), all of these studies revealed that dividend
payout has significant impact on a firm's performance, also; when managers have a significant
ownership (MO) they will influence the dividends policy in order to give a good indicator of a
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firm's performance especially when this policy meets the top shareholders expectations, this
result is in line with Zeckhauser and Pound’s (1990) argument as they mentioned that dividend
policy could be used as a signal for the firm's performance. However; our results disagree with
Gill and Tibrewala, (2010).
In conclusion; this study found that (MO. CO and DYLD) have the highest positive correlation
with and significant positive impact on firm’s performance when measured in terms of ROA,
while the least positive correlation with firm’s performance was ROE. In addition to that; MO,
CO, and DYLD have also a positive significant correlation and impact on firm's performance
when measured in terms of Tobin’s Q and NPM.
Table 3: Coefficient Analysis – Management Ownership (MO)
Model

Tobins’ Q

ROA

ROE

NPM

Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error Beta

t

Sig.

(Constant)

.948

.077

12.351

.000

MO

-2.149

.809

-.118

-2.658

.008

DEBT RATIO

.006

.153

.002

.037

.971

ASSETS TURNOVER

-.495

.089

-.254

-5.537

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-2.049E-010

.000

-.051

-.824

.410

EPS( PROF)

.783

.120

.430

6.537

.000

(Constant)

-2.196

.854

-2.573

.010

MO

21.537

8.992

.082

2.395

.017

DEBT RATIO

-1.152

1.697

-.024

-.679

.497

ASSETS TURNOVER

5.440

.994

.193

5.472

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-2.061E-008

.000

-.355

-7.460

.000

EPS( PROF)

22.274

1.332

.843

16.725

.000

(Constant)

3.537

1.998

1.770

.077

MO

6.869

21.048

.016

.326

.744

-8.484

3.972

-.111

-2.136

.033

ASSETS TURNOVER

-2.692

2.327

-.059

-1.157

.248

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-7.833E-009

.000

-.083

-1.211

.226

EPS( PROF)

5.819

3.117

.135

1.867

.063

(Constant)

-.136

.059

-2.313

.021

MO

.918

.519

.082

1.769

.078

DEBT RATIO

-.346

.102

-.166

-3.392

.001

ASSETS TURNOVER

.279

.064

.208

4.363

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-2.680E-010

.000

-.110

-1.672

.095

EPS( PROF)

.372

.077

.331

4.803

.000

DEBT RATIO
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Table 4: Coefficient Analysis – Concentrated Ownership (CO)
Model

Tobins’ Q

ROA

ROE

NPM

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized t
Coefficients
Beta

Sig.

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.407

.120

3.400

.001

DEBT RATIO

-.108

.152

-.033

-.713

.477

ASSETS TURNOVER

-.486

.090

-.245

-5.392

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-4.483E-010

.000

-.115

-1.836

.067

EPS( PROF)

.822

.117

.459

7.055

.000

CO

.008

.002

.252

5.561

.000

(Constant)

-1.640

1.119

-1.466

.143

DEBT RATIO

-1.190

1.417

-.029

-.840

.401

ASSETS TURNOVER

4.838

.842

.194

5.747

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-1.860E-008

.000

-.379

-8.163

.000

EPS( PROF)

20.358

1.088

.903

18.718

.000

CO

.007

.014

.015

.462

.645

(Constant)

6.121

3.324

1.841

.066

DEBT RATIO

-8.717

4.209

-.111

-2.071

.039

ASSETS TURNOVER

-2.681

2.502

-.056

-1.072

.285

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-7.056E-009

.000

-.075

-1.042

.298

EPS( PROF)

5.849

3.232

.134

1.810

.071

CO

-.038

.042

-.046

-.899

.369

(Constant)

-.185

.074

-2.482

.014

DEBT RATIO

-.430

.090

-.236

-4.781

.000

ASSETS TURNOVER

.221

.056

.187

3.918

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-3.075E-010

.000

-.147

-2.185

.030

EPS( PROF)

.330

.067

.342

4.934

.000

CO

.002

.001

.121

2.497

.013

Table 5: Coefficients Analysis – Dividends Payout (DYLD)
Model

Tobins’ Q

ROA

Unstandardized Coefficients

(Constant)

B
.975

Std. Error
.080

Standardized t
Coefficients
Beta
12.144

DEBT RATIO

-.071

.159

-.022

-.449

.654

ASSETS TURNOVER

-.467

.091

-.241

-5.107

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-2.910E-010

.000

-.073

-1.146

.253

EPS( PROF)

.867

.126

.478

6.883

.000

DYLD

-2.519

1.195

-.109

-2.108

.036

(Constant)

-2.765

.887

-3.116

.002

DEBT RATIO

.061

1.753

.001

.035

.972

ASSETS TURNOVER

4.879

1.011

.173

4.827

.000

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-1.892E-008

.000

-.326

-6.739

.000

EPS( PROF)

20.750

1.393

.785

14.895

.000

DYLD

43.631

13.214

.129

3.302

.001
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ROE

NPM

(Constant)

4.164

2.089

1.993

.047

DEBT RATIO

-9.379

4.128

-.122

-2.272

.024

ASSETS TURNOVER

-2.306

2.380

-.050

-.969

.333

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-8.846E-009

.000

-.094

-1.338

.182

EPS( PROF)

6.511

3.280

.151

1.985

.048

DYLD

-22.581

31.114

-.041

(Constant)

-.120

.059

DEBT RATIO

-.349

.106

ASSETS TURNOVER

.267

.067

TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE)

-2.612E-010

EPS( PROF)

.355

DYLD

.460

-.726

.468

-2.018

.044

-.167

-3.290

.001

.199

3.999

.000

.000

-.107

-1.590

.113

.082

.315

4.325

.000

.840

.030

.548

.584

Also, according to the coefficient table 3; it is found that t _values for the independent variables
(MO, CO, and DYLD) (-2.658, 5.561 and -2.108 ) respectively and control variables (ASSETS
TURNOVER, and EPS)( -5.537 and 6.537 ) are significant at 0.05 levels, which mean there is
significant effect of each of them on the firm’s performance measured by Tobin’s Q, while it's
found that DEBT RATIO and TOTAL ASSETS have insignificant coefficient with Tobin's Q as
a proxy for firm's performance (Sig, 0.971 and .410) which means that Management with
significant ownership preferring a stable level of debt ratio and invested assets high level of debt
and assets would decrease the ROA, ROE, and NPM when fixing other variables, also; this result
can explain the insignificant coefficient with Tobin's Q when Management concentrating on
constant level of debt and assets. At the end; these results are referred to that Management with
concentrated ownership of outstanding shares is preferring high level of assets turnover and low
level of Asset (SIZE) comparing to the total debt, which reflected by insignificant coefficient of
DEBT RATIO (Sig, .497) with Tobin’s Q, and significant coefficient of ASSETS TURNOVER
with Tobin’s Q. EPS has a significant coefficient with Tobin’s Q as MO prefers high EPS which
positively affects the market value of the firm (MVE). Similarly; (MO ,DYLD) and control
variables (ASSETS TURNOVER, size and EPS) are significant at 0.05 levels, which mean that
there is significant effect of each of them on the firm’s performance measured by ROA which
means that these independent variables are good predictors of firm’s performance when
measured by ROA, while CO does not have that significant coefficient (sig, .645) with ROA,
since this ratio is related directly to the management financial performance as management
ownership concentration would affect assets operating and financial policies, also; increased
assets turnover means that management is utilizing the firm’s assets (size) in generating sales
and returns as well. Consistent with correlation and ANOVA analysis in table 1 and 2 above; it's
found that (MO, CO, and DYLD) and all other control variables do not have a significant
coefficient with ROE except for DEBT RATIO (.033, .039, and .024) among the three study
variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) respectively; only the DEBT RATIO has a significant
coefficient of firm's performance measured by ROE, increased DEBT RATIO means that the
firm is utilizing the financial leverage to increase ROE.
On the other hand; it’s found that t _values for (CO) and the control variables (DEBT RATIO,
ASSETS TURNOVER, TOTAL ASSETS and EPS) are significant at 0.05 levels, which mean
there is a significant impact of each of them on the firm’s performance measured in terms of
NPM. (CO) and control variables (DEBT RATIO, ASSETS TURNOVER, TOTAL ASSETS and
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EPS) are considered good predictors of firm’s performance (NPM) which means also that
increased financial leverage and EPS reflected in NPM as a proxy of firm’s performance. While
the control variable (TOTAL ASSETS –Size) has an insignificant coefficient with firm’s
performance measured by NPM when inserting the independent variables (MO and DYLD) (sig,
.093 and 0.113) respectively, this exceptional result is referring to that MO is preferring a low
size of total assets and would affect inversely the ROA, ROE and DYLD as well. Our results
are lined with McConnell and Servaes (1990), a study by Xu and Wang (1999) showed that the
mix and concentration of stock ownership are significant in explaining the firm's performance.
As for robustness of performance of the control variables, their regression coefficients are quite
consistent in terms of both sign and significance level, across the four firm’s performance
measures; MO has a significant positive relationship (t= 2.395, sig, =0.017) with firm’s
performance measured by ROA, significant negative relationship (t= -2.658, sig, 0.008) with
firm’s performance measured by Tobin’s Q, while MO shows insignificant positive relationship
with ROE and NPM. While CO shows a significant positive relationship (t =5.561, sig, 0.000)
and (t =2.497, sig,
(0.013) with firm’s performance measured by Tobin’s Q and NPM
respectively, this result is lined with Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) in which they found a
positive relation between ownership concentration and firm performance. while it shows an
insignificant positive relationship with ROA and insignificant negative relationship with ROE.
Morck, et al. (1988) found no significant relationship in the linear regressions they estimate
when using Tobin's Q and accounting profit rate as alternative measures of performance.
DYLD shows a significant negative relationship (t= -2.108, sig, .036) with Tobin's Q, a
significant positive relationship (t= 3.302, sig, 0.001) with ROA, and insignificant negative and
insignificant positive relationship with ROE and NPM respectively. Our results are in line with
those of Uwalomwa et al., (2012), Murekefu and Ouma, (2013), Ajanthan, (2013), Priya and
Nimalathasan, (2013) and Khamees et al., (2015).
The major findings of the study are: First, MO and DYLD have a significant positive impact on
firm’s performance when deploying ROA as a proxy of firm's performance, and have a
significant negative impact on firm's performance when using Tobin’s Q. CO reported a
significant positive impact on a firm’s performance when deploying Tobin’s Q and NPM.
Second; MO and DYLD collectively have an insignificant positive impact on firm’s performance
when deploying NPM. Also; MO reported an insignificant positive impact on firm’s
performance when deploying ROE as a proxy of a firm’s performance, while CO reported an
insignificant positive impact on firm’s performance when employing ROA.
Finally, CO and DYLD reported an insignificant negative impact on firm’s performance when
deploying ROE as a proxy of firm’s performance, which means that NPM and ROE indicators
are less representative as proxies of firm’s performance at all, while; ROA indicator is more
representative as a proxy of a firm’s performance through this analysis.
Additionally, the study found that the control variable EPS has a significant positive impact on a
firm's performance when deploying ROA, Tobin's Q and NPM as proxies of the firm's
performance. The control variable Assets turnover reported a significant positive impact on a
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firm's performance when deploying ROA and NPM. Finally; the control variable Debt ratio
reported a significant positive impact on a firm's performance when deploying ROA.
On the other hand; the control variable Total Assets reported a significant negative impact on
firm’s performance when deploying ROA, ROE, and NPM, while the control variable Debt ratio
reported a significant negative impact on firm's performance when deploying ROE and NP.
However; the control variable Assets turnover showed a significant negative impact on a firm’s
performance when using Tobin’s Q. Table 6 summarizes the study results.
Table 6: Summary of study results
Deployed
Measure of
firm’s
performance

Independent
variable
(CO, MO,
and DYLD )

ROA

Control variable
(DEBT RATIO,
ASSETS
TURNOVER,
TOTAL
ASSETS and
EPS)

Impact on the
Dependent variable
( firm's
performance)

The most
Representative
Measure as a
proxy of a
firm’s
performance

Hypotheses: Reject
/Accept

MO, DYLD

Significant positive

ROA

H01, H02, and H03: Reject

Tobin’s Q

MO, DYLD

Significant negative

Tobin’s Q

H01, H02, and H03: Reject

Tobin’s Q,
NPM
ROA, Tobin’s
Q, and NPM
ROA, NPM

CO

Significant positive

Tobin’s Q

H01, H02, and H03: Reject

EPS

Significant positive

H04 and H03: Reject

Assets Turnover

Significant positive

ROA and
Tobin’s Q
ROA

ROA

Debt Ratio

Significant positive

ROA

H04 and H03: Reject

ROA, ROE,
NPM
ROE, NPM

Total Assets

Significant negative

ROA

H04 and H03: Reject

Debt Ratio

Significant negative

Not

H04 and H03: Reject

Tobin’s Q

Assets turnover

Significant negative

Tobin’s Q

H04 and H03: Reject

H04 and H03: Reject

Conclusion
This study aimed to provide empirical evidence from Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to address
the impact of ownership structure and dividends on firm’s performance of Jordanian
Manufacturing Companies listed on ASE. A sample of firms over the recent six-year period
(2010-2015) was selected. The data was derived from the annual financial reports of listed firms.
To diagnose and address the differences in results when using each one of the agreed measures
and to assess the relevance of each one to justify variant results found by previous studies; our
study used Tobin's Q along with other relevant accounting measures (ROA, ROE, and NPM) as
interpreters of firm’s performance. We run the regression analysis, ANOVA and Coefficient
Analysis to provide new empirical evidence on whether and in what way choice of measure of
ownership structure (MO and CO) and Dividends (DYLD) might impact the firm’s performance.
Also; four control variables were added to the model (DEBT RATIO, ASSETS TURNOVER,
TOTAL ASSETS and EPS). The three main independent variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) were
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added, one by one, to the four different sets of control variables, and their behavior is then
compared to the regression coefficient analysis.
In conclusion; our study provided an empirical evidence and rejected the null hypotheses and
accepted the alternative ones; which means that ownership structure and dividends impact the
firm’s performance of the selected sample, the study variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) are
significant predictors of firm's performance in most cases, and the control variables (EPS and
Total Assets) are also significant predictors of firm's performance, while (Assets Turnover and
Debt Ratio) are moderate predictors of firm's performance. In addition to that, the study found
that (ROA) and (Tobin's Q) are the most representative indicators as proxies of the firm's
performance, while NPM is still moderate. The study concludes that the study variables were
well selected and seemed to be good predictors of firm's performance so that all of them have an
impact on firm' performance.
At the end; the study recommends considering those variables for any future research, more so;
another control variable could be promoted to better predicting the firm's performance such as
governance mechanisms, board structure, management competence, motivation-based payment
structure, capital structure and external and internal auditing.
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